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
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Presses Japan for Peace Treaty

The USSR is using deadlocked negotiations on fishing rights as a means of compelling the Japanese to reopen peace treaty talks. Moscow probably hopes to force the Kishi government to abandon its claim to the Soviet-occupied southern Kuril Islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri—the major obstacle to a peace treaty between the two countries.

In the fishery negotiations which began on 13 January, the USSR has introduced proposals which would greatly hamper Japanese fishermen. On 5 February, Soviet officials refused to discuss measures to safeguard Japanese fishermen from seizure by Soviet patrol boats except in a framework of peace treaty talks.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishi announced on 12 February that his government is willing to undertake peace treaty negotiations with the USSR, but that they should not be linked with any fishing talks. His position, as stated last May, has been that Moscow must first accept Japanese views on the Kurils issue. Domestic pressure by fishing interests may now force Tokyo to allow the peace treaty and fishing talks to be linked. Tokyo probably will not, however, change its stand on the territorial issue despite the major importance to Japan of fishing in the restricted northwest Pacific waters.

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Opposition to Ulbricht Not Ended by Party Purge

Opposition to Walter Ulbricht, the Stalinist boss of the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) party (SED), was not ended by last week's purge of three party leaders,

[redacted] Karl Schirdewan, second man in the SED hierarchy until he was purged, has many supporters in the provinces [redacted]

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There is little likelihood, however, that Schirdewan and his supporters will be able to defeat Ulbricht or his policies as long as the East German leader enjoys Soviet support. Ulbricht coordinated the purge with Moscow,

[redacted] and convinced the Russians that the Germans must still be handled with force and brutality. In an effort to maintain his control of the SED, Ulbricht will probably undertake an extensive purge aimed at eliminating pro-Schirdewan elements and others suspected of holding revisionist or liberal views.

25X1 [redacted] there was no organized conspiracy against Ulbricht, but that Schirdewan and other party officials had attempted "in a friendly manner" to persuade Ulbricht to revise his political and economic policies. [redacted] Schirdewan favors German reunification, which the USSR refuses to consider, and believes East Germany should have more freedom in dealing with its own political and economic problems. [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Indonesian Situation

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A period of political and military maneuvering is probable, with all factions hoping to avoid violence. However, isolated incidents, possibly leading to localized conflict, could occur.

President Sukarno is expected to return to Djakarta on 16 February.

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III. THE WEST

Total French Evacuation of Tunisia Sought by Bourguiba

The American Embassy in Tunis reports that President Bourguiba plans to ask the UN Security Council to order the evacuation from Tunisia of all French forces, including those at the Bizerte base. Bourguiba would be willing to refrain from the UN appeal if assured that France will publicly agree within a few days to evacuate its forces. A phased withdrawal over a period of time would be acceptable to Bourguiba, but he insists that French evacuation of southern Tunisia must be "almost" immediate.

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Free world delegations are seeking to devise some type of UN machinery which would ease the impact of future incidents. French Premier Gaillard's defense before the National Assembly of the military action which created the crisis suggests the French Government will be unable to make any major concessions to Tunisia, and is not likely to evacuate Bizerte.

The establishment of a UN observer patrol along the Tunisian-Algerian border--similar to those used during the dispute between Greece and its Balkan neighbors--has been suggested. France, sensitive to any "internationalizing" of the Algerian question, would most likely refuse to allow the patrols on the Algerian side of the border, and Tunisia has pointed out that such patrols would not be able to prevent incursions by air.

An arrangement similar to the UN Emergency Force now deployed along the Egyptian-Israeli border probably would not be acceptable to France. Moreover, the Tunisian incident is not yet sufficiently critical to encourage UN members to contribute troops and equipment for another UNEF. However, some kind of UN action is inevitable.

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